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BREACH OF THE PEACE AND
NEW MEXICO'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
New Mexico's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, following the language of the 1958 Official Text, allows a secured party to
retake possession of his security without legal process providing he
does so without breaching the peace. Section 50A-9-503, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, reads as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to
take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party
may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without
breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble
the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to
be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to
both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment
unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises
under Section 9-504 [50A-9-504].'
Prior uniform legislation, the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 2 and the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act,a similarly granted the secured party
the right to repossess if he could do so without breaching the peace,
and similarly, in granting the right, did so without defining "breach
of the peace." Whatever precedent is available will have to come
from jurisdictions outside New Mexico. New Mexico, not having
decided the issue, is free to pick and choose the best precedents from
other jurisdictions, or, indeed, to strike out on its own with a new
approach. In those cases where a debtor has been successful in estab1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-503 (1953).
New Mexico's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 50A-1101 to -9-507 (1953), is based on the 1958 Official Text, promulgated jointly by the

American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
All references to New Mexico's version of the Code, often designated UCC both in
footnotes and text, will omit the full statutory citation. Citations to "Comments" are
those accompanying the 1958 Official Text.
2.
An entruster entitled to possession under the terms of the trust receipt or of
Subsection 1 may take such possession without legal process, whenever that is
possible without breach of the peace.
N.M. Laws 1947, ch. 151, § 6(2), repealed by N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 96, § 10-102.
3. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was never enacted in New Mexico.
For the pertinent language of the Act, see Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 16.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 4

lishing a breach of the peace by a secured party in4 the process of
repossessing, the recovery often has been substantial.
Courts which have dealt with the issue of a breach of the peace
while retaking possession of collateral have been vague in their efforts to define what breach of the peace means. Perhaps the best
definition, though far from adequate, can be found in Webber v.
Farmers Chevrolet Co.,5 in which the court states:
In general terms, a breach of the peace is a violation of public
order, a disturbance of public tranquility, by an act or conduct inciting to violence.
It is not necessary that the peace be actually broken to lay the foundation of a prosecution for this offense. If what is done is unjustifiable,
tending with sufficient directness to break the peace, no more is required.6
Within the terms of the Wfebber definition, New Mexico is free to
move in any direction deemed wise by its courts. In fact, the definition is so broad that it sets no meaningful limit or standard which
can be followed.
Cases will arise in which it is clear that a breach did occur-repossessing a piano from the debtor's locked home while the debtor
was absent, personal injuries to the possessor of collateral resulting
from a scuffle after the secured party was refused access to the collateral, 8 or, when it appears that there will be violence or force un4. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 Minn. L.
Rev. 205, 211 (1962).
5. 186 S.C. 111, 195 S.E. 139 (1938).
6. Id. at 113, 195 S.E. at 141.
For other definitions of the term see Devincenzi v. Faulkner, 174 Cal. App. 2d 250,
344 P.2d 322 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959): Breach of peace refers primarily to a disturbance of public peace and tranquility, and not every violation of a statute is a breach of
peace; Flores v. City and County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373, 376 (1950):
"Breach of the peace has often been defined as, 'a disturbance of public order by an
act of violence, or by an act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community.'"
7. Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934) (forcible entry though
specifically permitted in the contract of sale) ; see also Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142
A.2d 148, 150 (D.C. 1958) (trespass) : "While the contract gave the vendor the right
to enter upon the premises it did not expressly give the right to break in in order to
enter and we refuse to hold that it impliedly gave that right."
8. C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941) (assault and battery)
accord, Silverstin v. Kohler & Chase, 181 Cal. 51, 183 Pac. 451 (1919) (assault and battery).
When the scuffle occurs after the secured party has obtained possession of the col-
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less the debtor yields.9 Other cases will occur where clearly no breach
takes place-when the secured party is invited onto the debtor's
premises by the debtor's wife and she permits him to take the collateral, 10 or when the secured party repossesses an automobile
parked on a public street." In the absence of force, no breach of
peace results when the retaking occurs on private property without
lateral, but has not left the debtor's premises, no breach of peace results. See, e.g., Westerman v. Oregon Automobile Credit Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P.2d 435, 443 (1942):
In this case, although there was a refusal to consent, there was no physical obstruction. No violence would have occurred if plaintiff had not interfered after
defendants had taken possession. The taking of possession was in fact consummated by defendants without assault, battery, or intimidation and during the
absence of the plaintiff.
9. See, e.g., Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961)
(conversion); Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 258, 171
S.E. 63, 64 (1933) (trespass):
Where there is such a show of force as to create a reasonable apprehension
in the mind of one in possession of premises that he must yield to avoid a
breach of the peace, and he does so yield, this is yielding upon force, and constitutes forcible trespass.
Recovery against the secured party in the Manhattan case was allowed because the
secured party disregarded the debtor's objection to the retaking of the car and force
would have to have been used to prevent the taking. Recovery was allowed in the Freeman case since the secured party, after being told by the debtor's wife to wait until her
husband came home before repossessing, harshly disregarded her objection and pushed
the car from the garage.
A threat of force was also established in Kensinger Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 223
Ark. 942, 269 S.W.2d 792, 793-94 (1954), on the basis of the following testimony of the
defendant's manager:
'Q. Did you at any time touch Mr. Davis or threaten any bodily harm to him?
A. No. sir.
Q. You told him he couldn't drive it off?
A. I told him he wasn't going to leave in the truck.'
The court concluded:
This was a time when Davis was sitting in the truck with the key in his
hand. It was not shown just how Enochs [the manager] was going to prevent
Davis from leaving in the truck except through violence. The evidence justifies a finding that Enochs' statement was a threat of violence, was so intended
by him and so understood by Davis.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
10. Austin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 239 Miss. 699, 125 So. 2d 79 (1960).
11. See, e.g., McWaters v. Gardner, 37 Ala. App. 418, 422, 69 So. 2d 724, 727 (1954)
(action for trespass) :
The . . . [plaintiff] left his car parked on a public street; the . . . [defendant] had the legal right to repossess the property; without the knowledge or
consent of the . . . [plaintiff] the . . . [defendant], without either actual or
constructive force, possessed the car and conveyed it to its place of business.
See also Ikovich v. Silver Bow Motor Car Co., 80 Ore. 378, 157 P.2d 785 (1945), in
which the retaking of possession occurred behind the debtor's house with the automobile's front wheels in an alley; Gaffney v. O'Leary, 155 Wash. 171, 283 Pac. 1091
(1930) ; Lepley v. State, 69 Okla. Crim. 379, 103 P.2d 568 (1940) (dictum).
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the knowledge of the debtor 1 2 if the security agreement expressly
permits the secured party to enter the debtor's premises to retake
possession 1 3 or14 requires that the debtor deliver possession to the
secured party.
In addition to cases of actual force or violence, a breach-of-thepeace issue is raised when an attempted repossession gives rise to
threats of violence. The "threat" cases raise closer questions than
those in which actual force is involved. Thus, how should a court
proceed when there is an oral objection to the retaking but the retaking is executed without force, violence, or articulated threats? 15 Or
where permission once given is withdrawn, and bodily contact is necessary to restrain the debtor?' 6 There is some authority to the effect
that the use of derogatory remarks by the secured party-though no
12. Cf. Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938), in
which the secured party was held liable for retaking the debtor's automobile from a
hotel parking lot by breaking a window of the auto. In discussing security agreements
which allow the secured party to take possession on default, the court said:
To allow the holder of such a contract to be his own judge, and to execute
his judgment in any violent or forcible way he might choose, would be contrary to good order would be provocative of retaliatory violence and breaches
of the peace; wherefore, as a matter of public policy, no such right can exist.
184 So. at 441-42. See also Dominick v. Rea, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N.W. 184 (1924) (secured party broke into debtor's garage to repossess automobile).
13. Furches Motor Co. v. Anderson, 216 Miss. 40, 61 So. 2d 674 (1952) ; Morris v.
Halford, 352 Pa. 138, 42 A.2d 411 (1945) (entry made into debtor's home through unlocked door and furniture repossessed) ; North v. Williams, 120 Pa. 109, 13 At. 723
(1888) ; Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E. 410 (1909) (retaking of a horse over the
objections of the debtor was allowed since the seller had the contractual right to enter
the property and the retaking was not violent, forceful, or disorderly) ; Singer Mfg. Co.
v. Rios, 96 Tex. 174, 71 S.W. 275 (1903) (involved retaking of a sewing machine from
the debtor's premises without his consent and against the express wishes of the parties
in possession, but no force, violence, or breach of the peace was committed).
14. See, e.g., McLean v. Underdal, 73 N.D. 74, 11 N.W.2d 102 (1943).
15. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 1 So. 2d 776 (1941)
(judgment for debtor was reversed since secured party committed no actionable
wrong) ; Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E. 410 (1909) (secured party held not
liable).
In Flaherty v. Ginsberg, 135 Iowa 743, 110 N.W. 1050 (1907), the secured party
was permitted to enter the debtor's home, but the debtor objected to the taking of furniture including a bed which she contended was needed because of her pregnancy. The
debtor suffered a miscarriage following the retaking, but recovery was denied:
[T'ihe woman's helplessness and need must be such that to deprive her of the
bed will expose her to increased sickness and suffering, and such fact must have
been known or ought to have been known to the person demanding and removing the property.
Id. at 748, 110 N.W. at 1052.
16. See Biggs v. Seufferlein, 164 Iowa 241, 145 N.W. 507 (1914), where it was held
that the secured party was not liable because he had already acquired possession of the
collateral and could use force to maintain that possession.
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force or violence is involved-may render the secured party liable ;17
why words alone are sufficient for liability is unclear from the decisions.' 8
For purposes of the following discussion, unless the contrary is
specifically stated, it will be assumed that the parties have not by
contract limited the secured party's rights to repossess the collateral
on default. 9

HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEMS UNDER SECTION 9-503

Al. Generally-Force,Violence, and Damages
Hefty sold a truck-tractorto Rhodes receiving a security interest in
return to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price. After two
payments, Rhodes defaulted and Hefty sought to repossess. The collateral was found at a truck terminal. It was hitched to a loaded
trailer, locked, and with the brakes set. Hefty called a wrecker to
have the truck-tractor moved to Hefty's lot. An air cap on the side
of the truck had to be removed to permit entry to the inside. The
wrecker man then unhitched the truck-tractor and towed it to Hefty's lot. No physical damage was done to the truck-tractor in the
course of the repossession. The trailer which had been unhitched
contained fish, and the entire load spoiled before Rhodes could arrange to have it moved. Was there a wrongful taking of the collateral
here for which the debtor, Rhodes, can recover?

No force was used in repossessing the truck-tractor. Nothing was
broken or damaged. The air intake cap was removed, an act which
would be a trespass if done without the right of repossession being
present. This seems insufficient to constitute force, and, thus, is not a
breach of the peace. 20 The fact that the collateral was taken without
17. Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936) (defendant called the debtor a "deadbeat" and threatened to get the sheriff; debtor could recover for miscarriage resulting from fright); see also Freeman v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63 (1933) (judgment for defendant reversed
because of abusive language used).
18. But see Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., supra note 17, in which the plaintiff
became sick immediately following the derogatory remarks of the defendant and later
suffered a miscarriage.
19. UCC § 9-503: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right
to take possession of the collateral."
20. See Martin v. Cook, 237 Miss. 267, 114 So. 2d 669 (1959) ; Rea v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962) (secured party used coat
hanger to unlock automobile door; debtor denied punitive and compensatory damages).
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the knowledge or consent of the debtor is immaterial since there was
no actual force.21
Actual force, of course, may not be essential to a finding of a
breach of the peace. Some courts talk in terms of constructive force
being sufficient to support such a finding. Thus, if the collateral is
repossessed in such a manner as to cause the debtor to yield to the
secured party's demands, constructive force may be found although
no actual force was used.22 Constructive force is nothing more than a
phrase used to describe threats by the secured party which cause the
debtor to fear reasonably that force will be used unless the debtor
yields. It is submitted, however, that the New Mexico court should
apply the term "constructive force" differently. The phrase might
well be applied to permit recovery in the case posed. Thus, when it is
obvious to the secured party that the debtor intended to prevent
entry into or onto his property by any party, and the debtor is not
present when the retaking is attempted, then the secured party
should be considered to have used "constructive force" if he in fact
does enter. The term may well include entry into the debtor's locked
garage by prying the door open, going through an open window of a
locked house, or climbing over a fence surrounding the debtor's
premises. Since the courts will find actual force if there is physical
evidence of a forcible entry, 3 it logically follows that "constructive
force" should be established when the crafty or ingenious secured
party is able to make an entry without leaving physical evidence of
that entry.
Hefty, the secured party, might have been satisfied to collect the
amount owed on the note rather than repossess the collateral.2 4 Had
Rhodes been present at the time of the retaking it may be that he
would have paid the amount due, thereby preventing the repossession. This would have saved time and the expenses involved. Under
the decided cases, however, Rhodes' absence creates no liability on
Hefty's part. 25 And since Rhodes still has the right to redeem the
truck, he suffers no loss other than costs 26 and the loss of use of the
vehicle.
Since the truck-tractor comes within the Code definition of equip21. See McWaters v. Gardner, 37 Ala. App. 418, 69 So. 2d 724 (1954).
22. Crews & Green v. Parker, 192 Ala. 383, 68 So. 287 (1915) ; American Discount
Corp. v. Wyckroff, 29 Ala. App. 82, 191 So. 790 (1939).
23. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938).
24. See UCC §3-109(1) (c).
25. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
26. See UCC § 9-506.
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ment, 27 Hefty could have proceeded under the special equipment
provision of section 9-503 :
[W]ithout removal a secured party may render equipment unusable
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises ....

If Hefty had been unable to open the truck-tractor, he could have
lifted the hood and rendered the vehicle unusable. The quoted language talks only of disposing "of collateral on the debtor's premises." Here the collateral was located at a truck terminal, which
was not Rhodes' premises. In order for Hefty legally to dispose of
the collateral at the place of retaking, it would have to be argued
that the language of the above-quoted section is not exclusive. In
other words, the permissive language of the section is not meant to
allow disposition only on the debtor's premises, but at any place that
retaking occurs. Since the Code's repossession system attempts generally to minimize the expenses incurred in repossessing, it would be
quite unreasonable to read the Code as requiring that the secured
party incur unreasonable expenses of having heavy equipment moved
to the debtor's premises for disposition. It makes more sense to read
the section as permitting the disposition from the situs of the collateral at the time of repossession. It is urged that the section be
read this way.
The Code offers no aid in trying to determine how a secured party
should go about rendering the equipment unusable, except that it
must be done in a "commercially reasonable manner. ' 28 Any method
seems acceptable as long as the secured party uses no force in rendering the equipment unusable. Properly, a secured party could remove
a vital engine part such as the coil or distributor. Hefty possibly
could have removed the tires. Note that these items are usually readily accessible to anyone without requiring force. Hefty may have
been able to chain the equipment to a tree or other immovable object, and, thus, render the truck-trailer unusable. It is submitted,
however, that when equipment is rendered unusuable and the method
used for that purpose would not be visible to the debtor, the law
should require that the secured party immediately notify the debtor
so that he will not incur expenses in attempting to use his equipment
in ignorance of its having been rendered unusable.
Suppose Hefty had been able to gain entry to the truck only by
first breaking a window. By the weight of authority this would have
27. UCC § 9-109(2).

28. See UCC § 9-503, Comment.
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been a forcible entry 2 and, thus, a breach of the peace, making Hefty liable."0 Such liability might well include liability for the decay of
the fish in the trailer attached to the tractor unit. 1 If the secured
party has an absolute right to possession of the collateral upon default, it can be argued that nothing seems to justify holding him liable if he breaks a window while holding him harmless if he is able
to gain access without breaking anything. The value of the broken
window certainly is negligible when compared to the overall value
of the collateral. In the past liability has hinged upon this fact.
Despite the surface validity of the above argument, there is a substantial justification for the distinction, as stated in Commercial
Credit Co. v. Spence :32
The majority of people are honest and yield peaceable obedience to
their contractual obligations. When they do not so yield, it is, in most
cases, because there is some reason worthy of impartial examination
or consideration why they do not. To allow the holder of such a contract to be his own judge, and to execute his judgment in any violent
or forcible way he might choose, would be contrary to good order
would be provocative of retaliatory violence and breaches of the peace;
wherefore, as a matter of public policy, no such right can exist.
Under the facts . . . the conduct of appellant here in breaking
into the automobile and taking it by that means was a trespass; and
under all the circumstances the offense is properly to be characterized
as an aggravated and oppressive trespass, for which punitive damages
are allowable in the discretion of the jury; and the jury was properly
instructed on that feature.

An act of the secured party which constitutes a trespass-regardless
of the actual damage done to the debtor's property-is sufficient to
find a breach of the peace. The secured party always has the right to
get judicial process, and there is really no excuse or reason for the
secured party to break anything belonging to the debtor or any of
the collateral in the debtor's possession.
29. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938).
30. See Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961) (conversion) ; Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 230 Miss. 131, 92 So. 2d 468 (1957)
(trespass) ; Bordeaux v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 115 Mo. App. 556, 91 S.W.
1020 (1905) (trespass; reversed on other grounds) ; Webber v. Farmer Chevrolet Co.,
186 S.C. 111, 195 S.E. 139 (1938) (trespass).
31. Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938) (also allowed punitive damages) ; Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512,
23 S.E.2d 894 (1943) ; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625
(1936).
32. 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439, 441-42 (1938).
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B. JudicialProcess
Jim defaulted in making payments on a note he had signed along
with a security agreement when he purchased a car from Square Deal,
a car dealer who held the paper. Jim refused to permit Square Deal's
possessor to repossess in the absence of judicial process permitting him
to do so. The possessor, rather than going through the formality of
obtaining process from the court, went back to the office and picked
up an old replevy order. He brought along lake, an employee, to pretend to serve the "order." When Jake confronted Jim with the "order" and with the fake badge he wore, Jim released the car to Square
Deal's possessor. Was this a wrongful repossession?

Under section 9-503, Square Deal could either repossess without
breach of the peace or by obtaining judicial process. In any event,
Square Deal had the right to the possession of the collateral.
Though the process purported to be used here was void, the retaking of possession was peaceful. And if upon default there is a right
to repossession, any method of acquiring such possession as long as
it is peaceful should satisfy the requirements of the Code.33 Neither
Square Deal nor Jake, its employee, expressly represented that Jake
was an officer of the law.3 4 Further, the "order" was void on its face
and Jim could have ascertained this had he inspected it. 5
33. See, e.g., Grossman v. Weiss, 129 Misc. 234, 221 N.Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1927),
holding that a sheriff acting under a void writ was acting as the agent of the secured
party; so, if the secured party had a right to peacefully retake possession, he could not
endanger his position in this regard by attempting to do so under process of law, such
process being in fact void on its face. Grossman was followed in Hartford Acceptance
v. Kirchheimer, 166 Misc. 219, 2 N.Y.S.2d 224 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1938).
34. In Day v. National Bond & Inv. Co., 99 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936), the
secured party falsely represented an ordinary process server to be a "constable," and
the debtor then gave possession to the secured party. The court, though finding this conduct of the secured party to be reprehensible and indefensible, decided that this was a
moral question rather than a legal wrong since the debtor was in default and the secured party had a right to possession at the time the false representation was made.
See also North v. Williams, 120 Pa. 109, 13 AtI. 723 (1888), in which the secured
party entered the debtor's premises to repossess a piano. The debtor contended that entrance was made through a false representation by the secured party that he was going
to tune the piano. The court refused to find a trespass because entrance was made to
the property before the false statement was made.
35. See Day v. National Bond & Inv. Co., supra note 34.

But see See v. Automobile Discount Corp., 330 Mo. 906, 50 S.W.2d 993 (1932), in
which a void writ was used by a sheriff. The court held that since the debtor knew the
sheriff personally, the repossession under the void writ was a taking by coercion and
intimidation amounting to force within the law. The debtor had sufficient reason to believe that the legal papers were proper.
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It may be argued that the Code allows two separate and distinct
methods of retaking collateral-either (1) without breach of the
peace, or (2) by judicial process. If the debtor refuses to allow the
secured party to retake without judicial process it would logically
follow that a breach of the peace would occur if the secured party
attempted to proceed without such process. Therefore, the only alternative left for the secured party is to obtain judicial process. If
he does this then he has fulfilled the requirements of the Code. But,
if he attempts to repossess by misrepresenting that he has a judicial
process, or if he acquires possession of the collateral by any sham
whatsoever after he has been told to obtain judicial process, then
the secured party has retaken possession wrongfully and would be
liable the same as he would had he breached the peace.

II
REMEDIES UNDER THE CODE-SECTION

9-507

In assessing damages for a retaking which breaches the peace, it
is necessary to determine whether section 9-507 applies. On its face,
the section seems to provide an exclusive remedy. How effective or
complete this remedy really is is questionable. Subsection (1) of
9-507 provides:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition
has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose
security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to
the disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part. If the
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any
event not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the
principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per
cent of the cash price. [Emphasis added.]

The language of the subsection, "provisions of this Part" seems to
include the breach-of-peace provision which is in Part 5 of Article 9.
Query whether in fact it applies?
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When the secured party breaches the peace and thereby injures
the debtor in retaking collateral, the first sentence of subsection ( 1 )
offers little aid to the debtor. The only remedy offered in the first
sentence is that the disposition of the repossessed collateral may be
"ordered or restrained." Such an order, however, does not restore
the property to the debtor's possession or compensate him for his
injuries. It amounts to a delaying action.
Looking to the second sentence of the subsection, it is arguable
that two interpretations are possible : ( 1 ) The debtor has a right to
recover, after the collateral has been disposed of, for any loss caused
by a failure to comply with section 9-503, and (2) the debtor has the
right to recover for losses caused by the secured party in not complying with the methods of disposing of collateral provided in Part 5.36
In support of interpretation (1), it may be said that since section
9-507 attempts to provide a remedy for the failure to comply with
any and all provisions of Part 5, section 9-503 must therefore be
incorporated within section 9-507. Once the collateral has been disposed of, the debtor may recover any losses which he incurred when
the secured party breached the peace in taking possession of the collateral. But what difference does it make whether the secured party
has already made a disposition of the collateral since the debtor's
losses, over and above the loss of the collateral, are not contingent
upon the amount the secured party receives from the disposition? In
many instances a debtor's actual losses resulting from a secured
party's breach of the peace will considerably exceed the value of the
collateral. The fact that the collateral has been disposed of by the
secured party should not be a prerequisite for recovery under section
9-507 ( 1 ). This leads to interpretation (2).
Since it appears that the Code requires that the collateral be disposed of prior to a recovery for breach of section 9-503, the indication is that section 9-507 (1) was not intended to cover a breach of
section 9-503. This is not to say that the aggrieved debtor has no
recovery at all; it is only that he has no express recovery under the
Code. He may still have a tort action for his damages since the
Code does not prohibit such a claim. A study of the last sentence of
section 9-507 (1) will further support this argument. This sentence
provides for a minimum recovery if the collateral is consumer goods.
But why does the Code place consumer goods in a unique position as
36. See UCC §§ 9-504 to -505.
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damages can result
far as section 9-503 is concerned, since similar
37
when other than consumer goods are involved ?
The Code is somewhat vague in its attempt to provide a satisfactory remedy for a breach of section 9-503. If the collateral is wrongfully retaken under that section, and subsequently a wrongful disposition occurs of that collateral, then an action under section 9-507
(1) will result, and the debtor may also seek his recovery for the
wrongful retaking in the same action. If it is intended that the Code
provide a remedy for a section 9-503 breach, then section 9-507 (1)
should be amended to express such an intention and provide a remedy aimed specifically at righting the wrong. It is submitted that
the third sentence of subsection (1) of section 9-507 should be
amended as follows:
If the collateral is consumer goods, or if there is a breach of the peace
under Section 9-503 whether or not there has been a disposition of the
wrongfully taken collateral, the debtor has a right to recover ....

With the suggested language, the subsection would make it clear that
a wronged debtor may have at least a minimum recovery against the
secured party regardless of his actual damage when it is shown that
a breach of the peace occurred during the retaking by the secured
party. Certainly no serious objection can be made to this amendment
notwithstanding its absolute liability factor. It will have no effect
upon the secured party who retakes his collateral in an orderly,
peaceable manner. It should be noted also that a recovery under the
amended subsection is not contingent upon whether there has been
disposition of the collateral."
37. It has been suggested that purchasers of consumer goods are least able to protect
themselves from a non-complying secured party, so that a minimum recovery by the
consumer goods debtor will act as a restraint on non-compliance with the Code. I agree
with this proposition when referring to the "disposition of collateral" sections of the
Code, but when referring to a breach of the peace under § 9-503, an entirely different
approach must be taken.
Any debtor who has had his collateral property retaken from him, whether such
collateral be consumer goods or otherwise, is in no better position to protect himself
from such acts than is a non-consumer goods debtor. They stand in the same light;
either may refuse the secured party to retake without judicial process, and either may
be subjected to the same harm or injury by the secured party's breach of the peace.
38. This is important in two respects: (1) if the collateral has been wrongfully retaken under § 9-503, but there has not been a disposition of that collateral, the necessity
of ordering disposition under the first sentence of § 9-507(1) is thereby eliminated so
that suit may be instituted at once by the debtor for his damages; (2) if there has not
been a disposition of the wrongfully taken collateral and the debtor notifies the secured
party of his intention to recover for a breach of the peace, the secured party still has an
opportunity to mitigate the damages by agreeing to return the collateral.
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CONCLUSION

In discussing the provisions of section 9-503, it is, of course, impossible to include all the issues which may develop concerning it. It
is hoped, however, that the hypothetical problems presented in Part
II will help in understanding the general tenor of the section. A general rule concerning the breach of the peace provision may be framed
in the following fashion: A secured party has an absolute right, on
default, to possession of the collateral; however, whenever it appears that force or violence, or the apprehension of it, will be involved in the retaking of that collateral, then the secured party
should seek judicial process in retaking possession.
Consideration has been given to the possibility of proposing an
amendment to section 9-503 in order to spell out in the Code what is
intended by "breach of the peace," but no improvement would result. Specificity may only tend to shackle the courts in their interpretation of "breach of the peace." And it might make the section too
cumbersome or wordy to apply. Interpretation of the section should
be toward the prevention of force and violence when retaking collateral.
DAVID
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